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Abstract:

This paper develops a framework that analyzes how mergers and acquisitions
in Alberta’s oil and gas industry affect stock prices. In this experiment, a multivariate
regression is applied to several industry-specific variables to determine if they have
impacts on the abnormal stock returns of acquirers. The results show that abnormal
returns 5 days prior to the public announcement of the transaction are, in fact, driven
by several industry-specific variables. However, the returns immediately after the M &
A announcements are similar to previous research done in other industries. Acquirers’
gains 2 days after the announcement are essentially unaffected by the transaction.
After a 90-day period, the share performances of acquiring firms tend to beat the index
by 7% on average, but this is not thoroughly explained by the variables in the
regression analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

In a free-market world, companies are encouraged to continually grow and
become more efficient. A common way that firms have historically accomplished
this is through mergers and acquisitions (M & A’s). A merger is when two companies
fuse together and agree to carry on future business as one company. An acquisition
is when one firm purchases another firm, or an asset from another firm, and clearly
distinguishes itself as one company. M & A’s allow companies to grow instantly,
without having to develop another business entity. In every M & A transaction there
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is an acquirer and a seller. Acquirers aim to gain a greater share of the market to
increase their power, while sellers shed assets to increase efficiency. The main
purpose for an acquirer, however, is to increase financial success. In a public
company, financial success is reflected by its stock price.
Evaluating M & A impacts on acquirer stock price has been a hot topic in
finance for decades. Many economists and researchers have approached this subject
in different ways. In 1982, Paul Asquith and E. Han Kim ran a thorough experiment
that measured acquirer stock performance after an M & A. They concluded that
acquiring firms’ share prices are not significantly affected by the announcement of
an M & A. If anything, the share prices tend to slightly drop (1). This theory still holds
today.
More economists expanded on Asquith and Kim’s assessment by looking at
specific variables in M & A’s that potentially affect acquirer share price. For instance,
researchers have explored if an acquirer’s method of payment affects stock
performance after an M & A announcement. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984)
provided empirical evidence that showed that markets interpret a cash payment M
& A more positively for the acquirer than a stock payment (2). It is believed that
having the accountability to pay off debt forces managers to become more
disciplined in order to achieve greater performance. To add on to this conclusion,
Tim Loughran and Anand Vijh (1997) wrote, “Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit
From Corporate Acquisitions”. They concluded that this theory not only holds in the
short run, but in the long run as well. Acquirers that pay with cash perform much
better in the stock market than ones that pay with stock (3).
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In 1992, Deepak Datta, George Pinches, and V.K. Narayanan published,
“Factors Influencing Wealth Creation From Mergers and Acquisitions: A MetaAnalysis”, with the intention to isolate the variables in M & A’s that are most
influential to an acquirer’s share price. These authors ran a multivariate regression
to explore their hypothesis. They took M & A data from a wide range of sectors and
tested five independent variables that they thought explained their dependent
variable, shareholder return. I will be following a similar method in my experiment.
The results they found also supported past research. Acquirer share performance
was basically unaffected by M & A announcements, and most of their independent
variables were insignificant (4).
Since Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan’s model did not fully explain how an
acquirer’s stock performance is affected during an M & A, more economists have
continued to explore this facet. More recently, researchers have focused on one or a
few variables that they hope will help explain this phenomenon. For instance,
author Richard Rosen investigated the aspect of “hot” and “cold” merger markets,
where momentum is a factor in stock price after the announcement of M & A’s. He
concluded that in “hot” markets, M & A’s significantly increase share prices for
acquirers, but in the long-term (3 years), the share prices decrease. This supports
the theory that acquirers’ stock prices are essentially unaffected by M & A’s (5).
All of the authors previously mentioned have used data from a wide range of
sectors to run tests on this matter. They have considered many important variables
that should affect acquirer share price from M & A’s. However, as of now, nobody
has singled out the oil and gas industry in Alberta. One may argue that the same
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results from the previous tests would prove true in all industries, but the oil and gas
industry is very unique. Unlike most sectors, which have a few powerhouse
corporations that dominate the market share, Alberta’s oil and gas industry is
comprised of many similar-sized companies. In Calgary, there are 42 head offices for
oil and gas corporations with market capitalizations (market caps) of over $1
billion. Of these 42 companies, 10 have market caps of over $20 billion (6). In
addition, there are a copious amount of junior oil and gas startups with market caps
in the millions. The industry is also unique because none of these firms have the
competitive advantage of producing superior, less expensive products. They all
produce oil and natural gas that must be processed to meet industry-quality
standards. In addition, they are sold on the world market at a specific price.
Therefore, the competitive nature of the industry is to be efficient in exploration,
economical in production, and to find the highest quality of reserves to minimize the
costs of refining.
Alberta’s oil and gas industry has a high merger and acquisition activity. This
phenomenon is due to several reasons. First, companies have no competitive
advantage. In order to outperform competitors, firms constantly seek other oil
reserves to strategically purchase. This allows them to immediately grow and
become more competitive. Second, oil reserves have decline rates. Decline rates are
measured by the percentage that an oil well’s production decreases each year.
Typically, an oil well in Alberta will have a decline rate of approximately 20%. This
means, on average, that the well will pump out 20% less oil every year, even though
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decline rates are extremely sharp initially and then eventually level off. Figure 1.0
shows the typical relationship between time and production in an oil well.
Figure 1.0:

(7)

The decline phenomenon forces companies to continually work on increasing
their production. Firms do not want to have their production levels decrease by
20% every year. Since exploration is an arduous task, many firms resort to M & A’s
to fight this occurrence.
The other important explanation for high M & A activity in this industry
stems from the recently developed relationship between royalty trusts and oil
exploration and production companies. A royalty trust’s purpose is to continually
distribute income to its unitholders. Moreover, their required rate of return simply
has to be enough to continue operations while consistently paying its unitholders.
Royalty trusts do not undertake much exploration and development activity
themselves, because it is too costly and risky to undergo such a difficult task when
their rate of return required is not very high. Instead, royalty trusts seek oil and gas
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reserves that are producing. This is the role that oil exploration and production
firms serve. These companies need a large sum of capital to startup, and therefore
require a very high rate of return in order to beat the high costs of their
investments. The royalty trusts’ demands and the oil exploration and production
companies’ demands have formed a market of sole buyers and sole sellers in the oil
and gas industry in Alberta. Oil exploration and production companies are now
establishing oil and gas reserves and then selling out for a bulk sum to royalty
trusts. In turn, royalty trusts are fighting decline rates simply through M & A’s and
are avoiding the high risks involved with exploration and production. For
exploration and production companies, it is now common for groups of managers to
start a company, spend two to three years acquiring and developing oil and gas
properties, and then sell the company when it has reached the point where it has
become attractive to royalty trusts. The management team often holds on to a few
undeveloped properties so they can repeat the process over again (8).
The large amount of oil and gas firms, the battle to fight decline rates, and the
newly established relationship between royalty trusts and oil exploration and
production companies have caused an abnormally large amount of mergers and
acquisitions over the years. In years 2007 until second quarter 2010, there were
291 mergers and acquisitions in the Canadian oil and gas industry (9).
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II. OBJECTIVE:

Due to the uniqueness of the oil and gas industry in Alberta, it is rational to
explore its M & A transactions separately. The objective in this study is to find out
whether M & A’s in Alberta’s oil and gas industry are distinctive to those of other
industries. Moreover, I want to determine which industry-specific variables affect
abnormal stock returns the greatest.
By performing this experiment, I hope to provide investment bankers,
brokers, investors, and all people involved in the oil and gas industry with a greater
understanding of the M & A’s in Alberta’s oil and gas sector. As a result, firms
seeking to merge or acquire will be able to identify which industry-specific variables
will be most important in affecting shareholder return around the time of the M & A
transactions. This will help acquirers understand what helps them increase their
share price, assist underwriters in their M & A valuations, and aid investors in
deciding which deals will gain them the greatest returns.

III. DATA

Every business quarter, Sayer Energy Advisors release an M & A report titled,
“Canadian Oil Industry Merger and Acquisition Report.” The report consists of a
summary of the M & A activity in the quarter, a comparison between the M & A’s in
the quarter, and a detailed breakdown of each M & A transaction that occurred. I
borrowed 14 of Sayer’s reports from Mackie Research Capital Corporation, one for
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each business quarter between Q1 2007 and Q2 2010. I compared each of the 291 M
& A transactions within this timeframe and recorded the results on a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet. Figure 2.0 shows an example of a Sayer Report’s breakdown of
an M & A transaction.
Figure 2.0

(10)
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From the reports, I extracted variables that I thought would lead to abnormal
returns. Most of the variables that I analyzed for the experiment are calculated in
the Sayer reports, but I also calculated many myself. Table 1.0 shows the variables
that were calculated from the Sayer reports, the variables that I calculated from the
data provided, a description of each, and each variable’s calculation method.
Table 1.0:
Variable
Acquirer
Target
Announcement Date
Acquisition Type
Acquisition Price
Value of Reserves
Percent Paid for Non-Reserves
Premium to Market Price
Cost per Proven BOE1
Cost per Proven + Probable
(P +1/2P) BOE

Daily Production
Proven Reserves Life Index
Proven + Probable Reserves Life
Index
Reserves’ Percent Gas

Description
Company name of the buying firm.
Company name of the selling firm.
The date that the M & A
announcement was made to the
public.
Specifies if the buyer purchased
using stock, cash, or a combination
of both.
The amount paid for the entire
transaction.
The amount of money that the oil
and gas reserves are worth.
The percentage of the transaction
paid for assets that are not
reserves (land, equipment, etc).
The additional percentage over
current market price that acquirers
pay for the target’s shares.
The price paid for each BOE that
has a 90% probability of being
recovered from the reserves.
The price paid for each BOE that
has a 90% probability of being
recovered from the reserves, plus
each BOE that has a 50%
probability of being recovered.
The amount of BOE’s that the
assets produce each day.
The amount of years that the assets
can produce all of the proven
reserves.
The amount of years that the assets
can produce all of the proven +
probable reserves.
The percentage of reserves that are
natural gas.

Calculation Method
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Calculated by Sayer
Calculated by Sayer
(Acquisition Price – Value of
Reserves) / (Acquisition Price)
Calculated by Sayer
(Value of Reserves) / (Total
Proven Reserves)
Calculated by Sayer

Calculated by Sayer
Calculated by Sayer
(Proven + Probable Reserves) /
(Daily Production + 365 Days)
Calculated by Sayer

1 Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE): Common unit for oil and gas. 1 BOE is 1 barrel of oil or 6 mcf of natural gas.
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The next set of data that I accumulated was from Bloomberg. Since my
experiment exclusively analyzes the stock performance of acquirers, I gathered the
share returns of all acquiring companies during three time periods around the
public announcement of the M & A: 5 days before, 2 days after, and 90 days after.
Then, I tracked the performance of the S&P/Toronto Stock Exchange Capped Energy
Index and calculated abnormal return for each of the three time periods using the
following formula,

Formula 1.0
Acquirer’s Stock Gain or Loss (%) – Index Gain or Loss (%) = Abnormal Return (%)

After calculating the abnormal returns, I gathered the acquirer’s market caps
for each transaction. Then, I created a new variable, “Size of Deal Relative to Market
Cap.” This variable is a measurement that shows what percentage the M & A deal
was relative to the acquirer’s market cap. It is calculated using the following
formula,

Formula 2.0
Acquisition Price/Acquirer Market Cap = Size of Deal Relative to Market Cap (%)

I was forced to omit all of the transactions that had a private company as the
acquirer, because stock performance was unable to be tracked. This narrowed the
number of observations for my experiment from 291 M & A’s to 171 M & A’s.
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Although this is not ideal, 171 M & A’s in a single industry throughout 14 business
quarters is enough data to conduct a thorough experiment.

IV. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

For the regression analysis, I chose to include 8 independent variables to
help explain the dependent variable, abnormal returns to acquirers. 7 variables are
from the Sayer reports, and the last variable is the size of deal relative to the firm’s
market cap, calculated in Formula 2.0. Below are the rationalizations for choosing
each independent variable.

Corporate Transaction VS Asset Transaction
Acquiring an entire corporation is a substantial move for a firm to make.
There is immense upside potential when acquiring another corporation. Market
share greatly increases, there are several new assets immediately added to the
company, and there is new human capital. However, making a transaction this largescaled can be difficult to organize. Often, there are human capital issues like culture
clashes, and people do not understand or accept their new roles in the company.
Many successful businesses build by the slow accumulation of assets one at a
time. It is less risky than a corporate deal but offers less immediate upside potential.
Comparing Corporate Transaction to Asset Transaction will determine which method
provides superior abnormal returns to M & A’s.

12

This variable will act as a dummy variable in the regression analysis,
meaning that all corporate transactions will be regressed as “0” and all assets at “1”.
This will directly compare the two against each other.

Paper VS Cash
Previous authors have touched on this aspect of M & A’s. DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Rice made the conclusion that paying for M & A’s using stock (paper)
is inferior to using cash. Even if the conclusion holds, it is beneficial to see if Paper
VS Cash plays a larger or smaller role in the oil and gas industry than in other
industries.

Percentage of Transaction that is Non-Reserves
This measures if paying for assets other than oil has an affect on the share
price. Buying an asset like land leaves room from potential, but the market might
interpret this as a less practical purchase than straight oil and gas reserves that are
producing.

Cost per Proven + Probable BOE
The Cost per P + 1/2 P BOE is the price that acquirers pay for the common
unit (BOE) of oil and gas. Therefore, there should be a direct impact on stock
performance. If acquirers are paying a very high price for reserves, the market may
interpret it as an overpayment and then react by selling the company’s shares
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around the M & A period. The opposite may happen if the acquirer pays a low
amount for BOE’s.

Years of Proven + Probable Reserves Remaining
This variable shows how deep the pool of oil is in the purchased assets. It
plays a key role in determining the longevity of the assets. Most likely, the market
will interpret high years of reserves remaining as a positive aspect of and M & A,
which should impact abnormal returns.

Percent Gas
Each pool of reserves is comprised of oil and natural gas. Some are 100% oil,
while others are 100% gas. Most commonly, however, it is a combination of both. It
is vital to test if the market favors natural gas or oil transactions. The market may
value oil-heavy M & A’s more than gas-heavy M & A’s or vice versa.

Size of Deal Relative to Market Cap
As shown in Formula 2.0, this variable measures how substantial the deal is
to the acquirer based on the current size of their company. Some acquirers make
very small purchases to slowly increase their asset base. Other acquirers finance
massive deals that can more than double the value of their firm. It is vital to include
this variable in the experiment to see if the market likes big deals or small deals,
relative to a firm’s current size.
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V. METHODOLOGY

To assess the impact of the independent variables explained above on the
dependent variables, abnormal returns, I employed a multiple regression. Table 2.0,
below, shows the independent variables used in the experiment and my hypothesis
of how each will affect abnormal returns.
Table 2.0
Variable

Hypothesized Effect on Abnormal Return

Corporate

Negative

Asset

Positive

Paper

Negative

Cash

Positive

% of Transaction That is Not Reserves

Negative

Cost per P + 1/2P BOE

Negative

Years of P + 1/2P Reserves Remaining

Positive

% Gas

Negative

Size of Deal Relative to Market Cap

Positive

Since I measured the effects of these variables on abnormal stock returns in
three different timeframes, I conducted three separate regressions. Each regression
possesses identical independent variables, shown in Table 2.0. The dependent
variable is abnormal return, which changes in each regression to accommodate for
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the three different timeframes. Table 3.0 shows the formulas used in each
regression.
Table 3.0
Regression 1:
ar_5b = ß1(corp_asset1) + ß2(paper) + ß3(cash) + ß4(_non_r) + ß5(cost_boe) +
ß6(years_boe) + ß7(gas) + ß8(size_to_mc) + ε1
Regression 2:
ar_2a = ß1(corp_asset) + ß2(paper) + ß3(cash) + ß4(_non_r) + ß5(cost_boe) +
ß6(years_boe) + ß7(gas) + ß8(size_to_mc) + ε 1
Regression 3:
ar_90a = ß1(corp_asset) + ß2(paper) + ß3(cash) + ß4(_non_r) + ß5(cost_boe) +
ß6(years_boe) + ß7(gas) + ß8(size_to_mc) + ε 1
Legend
Dependent Variables:
ar_5b: abnormal return, 5 days before public announcement
ar_2a: abnormal return, 2 days after public announcement
ar_90a: abnormal return, 90 days after public announcement
Independent Variables:
corp_asset (0 = asset, 1 = corporate)
paper: Acquirers paying with stock
cash: Acquirers paying with cash
_non_r: Percentage of Transaction that is Non-Reserves
cost_boe: Cost per Proven + Probable BOE
years_boe: Years of Proven + Probable Reserves Remaining
gas: Percent Gas
size_to_mc: Size of Deal Relative to Market Cap

1

corp_asset is a dummy variable where 0 = corporate and 1 = asset.
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VI: RESULTS

Table 4.0:

Mean
Std. Dev.

REGRESSION RESULTS
AR_5B
AR_2A
0.021
0.010
0.192
0.115

0.073
0.411

Variables
Corp_asset
Paper
Cash
Non-reserves
Cost_BOE
Years_BOE
Gas
Size-to_MC

Coefficient
-1.07
0.25
-1.08
0.21
2.60***
-0.88
-2.54***
6.05***

Coefficient
-0.75
0.35
-0.28
-0.24
-0.58
-1.42
-1.33
0.24

Coefficient
-1.52
-0.47
-1.00
0.65
0.91
-0.18
-2.04**
-1.12

0.0262
-0.0219
0.55
171

0.0737
0.0279
1.61
171

R2
0.2793
Adjusted R2
0.2437
F
7.85
Observations
171
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.10

AR_90A

Abnormal Return 5 Days Before Announcement (ar_5b)
The regression results showed some significance in this test. Of the 8
independent variables, 3 were very significant: Percent gas (-2.54), cost per P +
1/2P BOE (2.60), and size of the deal relative to market cap (6.05). These variables
explained 28% of the variance within the data provided. This indicates that other
factors, which were not included, explained about 72% of acquirer abnormal return
performance. The average acquirer’s stock price increased by 2.1% 5 days prior to

17

the public announcement. The greatest contributor to this occurrence was from the
size of deal relative to the market cap, followed by the cost per P + 1/2P BOE, and
the percent of reserves that are gas. From my hypothesis in Table 2.0, only 2 of the 8
independent factors were correct. Since 3 were significant, the remaining 5 were
incorrect hypotheses. Of the 3, percent gas and size of deal relative to market cap
were correct. The price per p + 1/2p BOE played a positive role, while I estimated
would be negative.

Abnormal Return 2 Days After Announcement (ar_2a)
The regression results for this timeframe were highly insignificant. Abnormal
returns only increased by 1% 2 days after the public announcement of the M & A,
and the 8 independent variables explained a miniscule 2.6% of the variance of
abnormal returns. None of the independent variables were statistically significant,
making all of my hypotheses incorrect.

Abnormal Return 90 Days After Announcement (ar_90a)
90 days after the announcement, the acquirer stock has had time to develop
and see results from the recent M & A. On average, the acquirers’ stocks went up by
7.3%. That is a high abnormal return for 90 days and should look attractive to
investors. However, the independent variables I used in this experiment did not
explain, to a large extent, why the abnormal returns were so great. The only
significant variable in this regression was the percent of gas the reserves possessed,
which had a t-statistic of -2.04.
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VII. EXPLANATIONS

The results seen from the three regressions show that only a handful of
variables were significant at specific times. First, the size of the deal relative to
market cap was very significant leading up the announcement. Since no public
announcement had been made in this timeframe, the hype of the magnitude of the M
& A from information leakage drove up the acquirers’ stock prices. As information
leaks, people anticipate a massive deal in the making, and therefore, buy shares in
hopes to get in early and benefit from the potential upside of the transaction.
The second significant variable in the first regression was the percentage of
natural gas in the reserves purchased. The more gas, the worse the stock performed.
This is mainly due to the high price of oil. Oil is sold on the market at approximately
$84 dollars per barrel, while natural gas is sold at approximately $4.50 per mcf
(1000 cubic feet). 1 barrel of oil (bbl) produces roughly the same amount of energy
as 6 mcfs of natural gas. If averaged out, 1 BOE of pure oil would sell for $84 while 1
BOE of natural gas (6 mcf) would sell for ($4.50 X 6 mcf) = $27. The M & A’s
analyzed from the Sayer reports were from 2007 until 2010, when oil reached
astronomical prices around $140 and natural gas acted less volatile. As a result, oil
deals were extremely valuable. Figure 3.0 shows how much higher the price of oil
has been in recent years versus natural gas.
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Figure 3.0

(11)

Another noticeable factor in the first regression was the cost per P + 1/2P
BOE. My hypothesis was incorrect. I believed that the higher the price paid for each
BOE, the worse the stock would perform. Moreover, I thought that the market would
interpret the deal as an overpayment by the acquirer. However, the positive impact
that this variable had on abnormal returns 5 days prior to the announcement could
be linked to the percentage of natural gas variable. The acquiring companies could
be buying reserves that are oil-heavy and, therefore, cost more for each BOE. As a
result, the market may have valued the higher price paid for each BOE as positive,
driving abnormal returns upward.
The second regression turned out to be extremely insignificant. The mean
acquirer abnormal return was only 1% 2 days after the public announcement. One
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can rationally assume that this timeframe should encourage share price volatility,
because the market would have to revalue the business once it received the details
of the transaction. However, since the market only drove prices up by 1% on
average, investors may have believed that acquirers bought their assets at the
correct price. Otherwise, if they purchased low, the market would drive the price of
their shares up to adjust for the increased value to the company. The opposite
would happen if the market saw an overpayment in the M & A.
The purpose of the third regression was to allow the market to have enough
time to properly value the M & A transaction, while not giving the firm the
opportunity to take part in any other significant events that could interfere with
abnormal returns. The regression showed that abnormal returns were, on average, a
boost of 7.3% to acquirers 90 days after the M & A transaction was made public.
Unfortunately, the variables in the model did not explain the cause of this abnormal
return increase. The only variable of significance was, once again, the percentage of
gas in the reserves purchased. It is extremely difficult to explain why acquirer
abnormal returns went up by 7.3% because external variables, which are infinite in
possibilities, explain 98% of the model.
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VIII: POSSIBLE ISSUES WITH DATA

The three regressions conducted did not sufficiently explain why abnormal
returns for acquirers had the calculated results. The data could be improved in two
ways. The first improvement would be to add more transactions. The number of
observations in the regressions was 171, so adding several hundred more
transactions would likely increase the preciseness of the data. Second, the data
could be improved by adding other variables. Only 3 variables from the regressions
were significant. Moreover, in the ar_2a regression, none of the variables were
significant. If independent variables outside of the Sayer Reports were added to the
model, the R2 would undoubtedly improve. It would be difficult to choose the
additional variables, because one could look at an infinite number of possibilities.
Another factor to consider with the data could be from the time period it was
in. During years 2007 until 2008, the economy was in a severe recession, and in
2009, it was still wounded. This could result in skewed data. In addition, during the
recession, the price of oil was higher than ever, which may have strongly affected
the regressions, since the heavy oil deals were far superior to gas. Also, the
abnormal returns for the acquirers may have been skewed, because people were
selling far more often than buying during the above years. Lastly, investor
confidence was extremely low, so adding M & A transactions from the early 2000’s
to the present time would help eliminate this problem.
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IX: CONCLUSION

Overall, the results found in the multivariate regressions gave insight into
how M & A’s affect acquirers’ abnormal returns in the oil and gas industry in
Alberta. It is clear that the higher oil to natural gas ratio that the purchased reserves
possessed, the higher the stock price increased. It appears that none of the other
variables were significant enough in the experiment to draw a strong conclusion.
This leads one to believe that abnormal returns are affected by other factors. It is
commonly known that the stock market is difficult to predict, and these regression
results support that theory.
Even though this industry is highly unique in its M & A activity compared to
other industries in the world, the acquirer share performance around an M & A is
still essentially unaffected. In order to better explain acquirer abnormal returns,
more variables would have to be included in the regression analysis. However, it is
important to understand that stock markets are highly unpredictable, even with
valid data.
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